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ABSTRACT
The publicly-traded real estate company is analyzed from
two perspectives: that of the investor and that of the real
estate developer or manager. For the investor, the public real
estate company is an important vehicle by which individuals
with limited capital can invest in real estate. Realty stocks
are liquid assets which provide investors with the opportunity
to participate in the cash flow and appreciation of real
estate. For the developer and/or owner of real properties, the
public company offers access to capital markets and liquidity.
This thesis first gives a brief history of the public real
estate corporation and outlines the characteristics of real
estate firms and alternative public structures for developing
and managing real estate assets. The historical performance
record is then examined for a sample of twenty-six companies
over the fifteen-year period from 1973 to 1988. Real estate
stock returns are correlated with other investments and
macroeconomic indicators. Risk-adjusted returns are calculated
for each company and for the portfolio. Returns are also
analyzed for various holding periods during the business cycle.
Three companies -- Perini Investment Properties, Bay Financial
Corporation, and the Koger Company -- are examined in greater
detail, in a case study format. Finally, conclusions are drawn
and conjectures about past performance and future trends are
offered.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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PREFACE
The real estate corporation is a fairly recent
phenomenon. A few companies have been in existence since the
early part of this century, but it was not until the 1960s
that the public realty firm began to proliferate.[14] The real
estate industry has traditionally been characterized by the
opportunistic entrepreneur who operates "by the seat of the
pants" and works on a deal by deal basis. In this industry,
the public company is an anomaly, and some believe that it is
an inappropriate vehicle for holding and developing real
estate.
The examination of the public real estate firm is
important for several reasons. First, public real estate
companies are a significant portion of the real estate
industry, particularly the residential sector. Second, they
are an important vehicle by which the small investor, with
little capital, can invest in real estate. Third, the
analysis of the past performance of real estate companies
should provide a basis for expectations about future returns.
Fourth, the study may provide some insights into the nature of
the real estate securities market.
CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC REAL ESTATE COMPANY
Public real estate companies are formed for four primary
reasons: to provide liquidity for the owners, to separate the
real estate operations from other activities of the company,
to "roll up" existing companies or real estate holdings into a
single entity, and, most importantly, to raise capital for new
developments.
Many real estate companies begin as small, family-owned
businesses and are often general contractors as well as
developers. As the development business grows and matures,
the owners may become asset-rich but cash-poor. The public
structure provides one way of gaining liquidity without
selling valuable, cash-producing, real estate holdings. By
translating real estate and intangible assets -- such as
talent, reputation and track-record -- into stock that is
marketable, a developer can increase his personal wealth. A
substantial share of the company can be retained, and the
proceeds of the public offering may be used to finance other
ventures.
Many companies that are not in the real estate business
have substantial holdings of office and industrial space and
raw land. Large industrial corporations and companies in the
building products industry often have valuable real estate
holdings which are under-utilized and poorly managed.
Typically, these assets do not contribute to the earnings of
the company and most corporate executives have a poor
understanding of the value and characteristics of their real
estate. Some corporations, such as the Ford Motor Co., formed
separate real estate companies or profit-centers to focus on
independent development activities. These "spin-offs" have
the ability to respond more quickly to development
opportunities and can be valued as a separate entity.
Private real estate companies and limited partnerships
sometimes merge with other real estate-related entities to
form a new public corporation. These mergers, or "roll-ups",
consolidate real estate holdings and may provide the owners or
partners with the benefits of liquidity, geographic and
product diversification, and a larger, financially stronger
company.
Perhaps the most important advantage of the publicly-held
corporation is its ability to raise capital by accessing the
traditional capital markets. Reliance on project-by-project
financing limits a developer's growth opportunities; real
estate entrepreneurs are often forced to pay high interest
rates or joint venture with a partner who provides "front-end"
capital in exchange for a large share of the project. A
public stock offering gives a company the ability to raise
capital to invest in new ventures and facilitates rapid
growth. It also fits the mold with which Wall Street is most
familiar, and provides the capital base to attract
financing.[17]
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC REAL ESTATE COMPANY
In the first half of this century, some real estate
stocks were traded on the market, but were often considered
inferior securities when compared with the stocks of
industrial firms. Several factors contributed to this
perception. Most real estate firms were relatively small.
Their assets typically consisted of a portfolio of distinct
properties, thus the true asset value and management was
difficult to evaluate. In addition, development firms were
speculative in nature, and therefore perceived to be very
risky. Income properties were characterized by fairly flat
returns, since inflation was low and rents stable. For these
reasons, many investors felt that investment in real estate
stocks did not offer returns which were high enough to offset
the perceived risks.[17]
In the mid '50s, many real estate syndications were
formed to provide tax shelters for wealthy investors who were
concerned about high post-war federal tax rates. Real estate
was an ideal vehicle for sheltering taxes, since profits could
be shielded through accelerated depreciation and other
deductions. In the late '50s and early '60s, many of these
real estate syndications merged and became corporations.[14].
The Glickman Corporation and Major Realty are two examples of
well-known corporations which were created through the
consolidation of syndications. Tax concerns were the primary
stimulus behind the movement from syndicates to corporations.
The changes were prompted by the fear that the Treasury would
impose regulations taxing management syndicates as
corporations, rather than partnerships. Taxes could be
minimized by combining several syndicates into one company,
since taxable income from one property could be offset by
losses on another.[17]
After the merger, investors were given shares of stock in
the new company in exchange for their original syndicate
holdings, thus exchanging a stake in a single building for a
share in a broader pool of diversified properties. These
companies offered investors several advantages over the
syndication. Because the companies were composed of the
assets of several former syndicates, their portfolios were
diversified, reducing the risk to the investor. The investor
gained liquidity, since his stock could be traded on the
market. The formation of these companies also allowed the
small investor with little capital to invest in real estate.
Many private real estate companies, particularly
homebuilders, also went public in the late '50s and early
'60s. Levitt and Sons was the first and the largest to go
public after World War II. The postwar building boom created
a situation in which many builders were outgrowing their
capacity to generate enough working capital. To grow quickly,
these companies needed to broaden their financial base, and
the public structure was an attractive option to many.[9)
In mid-1962, the real estate stock market took a sharp
downturn. When Robert Futterman, founder of the prominent
Futterman Realty, died, it was discovered that the healthy
performance of his corporation's stock was due to the fact
that dividends in excess of cash flows had been paid out. The
price of real estate shares in Futterman plunged, as did the
stock of many other companies which were suspected of similar
practices. Shortly after Futterman's collapse, the Glickman
Corporation's stock fell from $13 to $6 a share, following
disclosures that the company had made personal loans to
Glickman to fund his private development deals. In June,
1962, the SEC imposed more stringent reporting requirements
for real estate firms to prevent future disasters, but the
investing public had already become disenchanted with real
estate stocks.[17]
The late '60s saw a resurgence of real estate firms in
the public market. From 1969-1970, 133 real estate-related
firms went public, raising $575 million in initial offerings.
This was 3.8% of the total equity raised through stock sales
for all types of companies in these years; real estate
investment trusts raised another 12% of the total. Industrial
stocks were doing poorly on Wall Street, and the financial
markets perceived real estate as having the potential for high
profits. The list of companies that went public in this
period include Ryan Homes, Leisure & Technology, and the
Centex Corporation. Homebuilders were expanding rapidly, and
the major players were increasing their share of the
market.[9]
Beginning in 1973, the national recession, rising
interest rates, and an overbuilt real estate market had a
strong adverse effect on the performance of real estate
stocks. The market had recovered by 1975, but high interest
rates made borrowing costly during the late '70s and early
'80s. New stock issues were a more attractive way to raise
capital and several companies, including Bresler & Reiner and
the Sunstates Corporation, went public during this era.
Strategies for success in the late '70s and '80s have
varied depending on the size and type of firm. Those that
have fared the best in recent years, such as the Ryland Group,
have a broad geographic base. Many of the homebuilders are
concentrated in the southwest, and have suffered from the
problems of an overbuilt market and weak local economy.
Builder/developers who have diversified into other industries
have met with marginal success. The Del E. Webb Corporation
was founded in the 1940s and has been a public company since
1960. Webb diversified into the leisure market -- principally
Nevada casinos -- in the '60s. The casino operations were
quite profitable for a period, but fell on hard times in the
'80s. To jack up earnings, Webb sold large parcels of
undeveloped land between 1983 and 1986, eliminating its future
source of profits in return for short-term gains. The
company's stock is now trading at less than fifty percent of
the estimated current value of its assets, and Webb may be
force to liquidate its holdings and sell off the pieces of the
company.[24]
A number of investment-oriented real estate companies
went public in the early '80s. Some of these, such as Bay
Financial Corporation and Southmark Corporation converted from
real estate investment trusts. Others were spin-offs from
development or construction-related companies, including the
Koger Company and Perini Investment Properties.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE REAL ESTATE COMPANY SECURITY GROUP
The real estate industry is composed of two segments
which can be broadly defined by investment objectives. The
first category consists of those companies which purchase and
develop land and/or buildings for sale. Many of these
companies are speculative in nature; they have a short-term
interest in the property and are earnings-oriented. This
category consists primarily of land developers and home
builders. The second category of real estate company is
composed of firms which purchase or develop property to manage
as a revenue-generating enterprise over a number of years.
These companies hold a portfolio of investment properties for
the cash flow they generate and for long term appreciation in
value. Their assets may include shopping centers, apartments,
office and industrial buildings, and hotels. The investment
companies usually derive benefits from tax savings, as well
as annual cash flows and appreciation.
A third major real estate group which is often included
in discussions of the industry, is the financial services
sector. This group includes real estate investment trusts of
the mortgage type, mortgage bankers, savings and loans, and
commercial banks. The focus of this paper is on companies
which are active participants in the development and/or
management of real estate, rather than passive suppliers of
capital. However, many of these companies are vertically
integrated, and may provide financial services and other
products.
Most public real estate companies belong to the first
category, the developer/builder. Exhibit 1 shows a list of
the top 100 homebuilders in the United States of which 34 are
publicly-traded. A list of the top 100 commercial developers
is shown in Exhibit 2; only three of these companies are
public. The public structure is generally more attractive for
homebuilders because of the short-term nature of their
projects. A home-building firm usually undertakes a series of
development projects, with typical turnover periods of less
than two years.[12] Because holding periods are very short,
quick profits can be realized, and expenses on developments in
progress can be balanced against profits from current house
sales. Single-family and condominium development does not
offer the tax advantages of depreciable properties, but it
does avoid the problem of reconciling long-term growth and
appreciation with the need for short-term reportable earnings.
Because the construction and sale cycle is short, operating
results can be quickly reflected on earnings statements. The
large number of new household formations in the '60s made
homebuilding a rapidly growing industry, and the need for
capital for expansion encouraged many of these firms to go
public.[11]
Real estate companies engaging in the development or
acquisition of offices, apartment buildings, and retail
centers face the problem of operating book losses during
relatively long construction and holding periods. Some solved
this dilemma by forgoing the profits that could be realized by
a long-term holding and managing strategy and adopted a
building-for-sale approach. Many of these properties were
sold to syndicators, who would package the assets for sale to
high-income individuals in need of tax write-offs. With the
Tax Law of 1969, low-income apartment projects were given
special advantages, and they became very attractive
investments for wealthy individuals.[11]
Some public companies, such as Bay Financial Corporation,
have both long-term and short-term interests in real estate
and engage in the acquisition of investment properties as well
as speculative development. Often, however, these activities
are separated. Several entities, such as Koger
Properties/Koger Company are composed of one company which is
a developer and a separate corporation which holds and manages
investment properties. This structure allows each company to
pursue its unique objectives and avoids the problems of mixing
a cash-flow oriented business with an earnings-oriented
business.
Some commercially-oriented development companies
attempted to avoid the problem of low reported earnings by
using one method of accounting for tax purposes and recasting
the figures for reporting to shareholders. By reporting cash
flows and current values, as well as earnings and book values,
a company's value can be better communicated to the market.
This method requires some sophistication on the part of
corporate executives, investor and analyst, and has not been
standardized or fully accepted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
THE "PUBLIC" PROBLEM
The story of Tishman Realty and Construction Company
illustrates the problems peculiar to a commercially-oriented
public development company. Tishman was founded in 1898 as a
developer of tenement buildings and went public in 1928,
following the advice of Lehman Brothers. Within a year, the
Tishman family, who retained management control throughout the
life of the company, had become disillusioned with the public
structure, and started to try to buy stock in the company.
After the stock market crash, the shares were trading at a
quarter of a point, but the Tishman family did not have the
cash to buy them back, and focused instead on enhancing the
company's profitability. In the '50s and '60s their hard work
paid off. Tishman became a national developer and diversified
into office buildings and equipment leasing. By the late
'60s, Tishman had become the leading owner-builder of
high-rise office buildings in the nation.[23) The Tishmans
still did not feel that the stock price accurately reflected
the value of the company's substantial holdings, and
considered conversion to a REIT. This idea was ultimately
rejected because the managers felt that Tishman's business --
construction, development, and management -- was
irreconcilable with the SEC requirements for REITs that
governed the separation of functions and almost complete
15
pass-through of earnings.[17] In the early '70s, the high rate
of inflation had a devastating effect on Tishman's operations.
Its vast inventory of property was carried on the books at
original cost less depreciation. As operating costs and debt
service escalated, Tishman's book assets became lower than its
balance sheet liabilities, sinking it into a negative net
worth position. This meant that Tishman could not pay
dividends, and its stock dropped from $21 a share in early
1974 to $11 a share in mid-1976. The Tishman family, with the
assistance of Morgan Stanley, decided that liquidation was the
best solution. In late 1975, the company's major properties
were sold to the Equitable Life Assurance Company and the
proceeds ($11/share) were distributed to the stockholders.
The remaining properties were put into a limited partnership,
with each stockholder receiving a proportionate share.[25]
For many, the Tishman liquidation confirmed the belief
that the public corporation is a poor vehicle for holding real
estate. The failure of Tishman to increase its market price
to a point where it represented the true value of its real
estate assets was a source of great frustration. Robert
Tishman, the grandson of the original founder, was the chief
executive officer when the company liquidated. He explained
that Tishman "went crazy trying to demonstrate to people that
the assets were worth more than the stock. We ran charts on
value per share. We talked endlessly to analysts, but they
were always transferred to something else whenever we got them
educated." [23] This inability to "educate" stockholders and
analysts was responsible for the demise of one of the
country's oldest and largest real estate companies.
Many of the home-builders also failed after becoming
public companies. Of the seventeen public builders in
existence in 1963, only nine survived to 1972.[8] Not all of
these failures were directly related to the public nature of
the company. Many failed because they simply attempted to
grow too quickly or were poorly managed. The need for quick
growth was stimulated partially by the demand for housing, but
was also fueled by pressure from the market and stockholders
to show high earnings and short-term profits. As the
companies grew and diversified geographically, it became
difficult to control quality and costs. Overhead increased
and managers were often inexperienced and spread too thin.
Skilled labor was hard to find, and a product which was
successful in one town often failed when transplanted to a
different climate or locale. Often, the original success of a
company was due to the skills of its founder, who typically
employed a "hands-on" approach and close supervision of his
projects. A large, corporate organization required a
different approach, which was often incompatible with the
entrepreneurial style of the key manager.[8]
Today, the public real estate industry is composed of
homebuilders, office and apartment builders, hotel operators,
and property managers. Many of the companies are diversified
and engage in both development and management of a number of
product types. (see Exhibit 4) Despite the failure of many
companies, others have existed for over twenty years and a
number have survived three recessions. Thus, it is not clear
that there is a "limited future for development-oriented or
owner-managed real estate corporations as an important class
of common stocks on major exchanges."[17]
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Exhibit 4
SAMPLE OF PUBLICLY-TRADED COMPANIES BY PRODUCT TYPE
NAME * of # OF REION PROP TYPE OTHER PRODUCTS
P ROERTIES STATES
Centex Corp.
Christiana Companies inc.
K auman I Br oa
Leisur E Technoy c
Lennar
tao Rely Core,
Oriole riamas ~Crp
FPul.t e -Hom0e C n-.[
PtEnPunta Bod Ile In.
Web ri E t C P- 11.
Fr eS Ci ty Entepie
jrthyie- Ccro.
RV!s C D .
cne ta MInte rnr. Hotel I
S;outhmrk r p
southwest
divers.
BATXACA
FLPANJ
southwest
CAFr ance
CANJNY,FL
FLAZTY.
FL
divers,
divers,
divers.
South east
di ver 
AZNM
se~sw
divers.
divers,
divers.
divers.
res-sifcondo
res-sf,condoland
res-sf,condo
res-si,condohotel
land subdivider
res-sf
res-sfaf retirement
res,cosa
res,hotel
res-sfcondo
res
res-sf ':ondo,apt
res-sf,condo
sf
res,hotel rec.
book/mag distributor
construction, bld. .atis.
contractormtQ. firance
life ins,financial serv,
sto. finance
casino operator
off ice,ind ,res~hotel
resofficehotel,retail financial services
comaresofficehotel
retail,apt,office.hotel construction, bid, satis,
suburban office
office,corm,reshotel minerals
hotel financial services
shopping ctroffice
hotel
hotel
nursing homeapt~officehotelretai
Source: Mody 's Bank and Finance Manual, 19R7 edition and 10k reports
CHAPTER II
REAL ESTATE SECURITIZATION
THE PUBLIC REAL ESTATE COMPANY IN THE MARKETPLACE
The Accounting Dilemma
Public real estate companies face one major obstacle
which has led to the demise of several large firms and
prevented many others from going public: traditional
accounting practices fail to communicate the underlying market
value and performance of real estate assets. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates accounting procedures
for public companies, and makes few distinctions between the
GAAP rules for commercial and industrial companies and those
for real estate firms. This type of reporting emphasizes the
earnings performance of a company but does not recognize the
unique characteristics of real estate, particularly cash flows
and current value. Price-earnings ratios and book value are
useful for measuring the value of industrial companies but
are misleading measures for real estate, which is a cash-flow
oriented business.
Depreciation further distorts real estate values, since
it lowers book value but generates tax savings. Depreciation
allocates the acquisition costs over the "useful" life of a
building. On the books, the value of a property decreases
steadily each year, but for most properties, market value
usually increases at a rate close to the rate of inflation. A
well-located building may experience far greater appreciation.
The portfolios of many public real estate companies contain
properties which have a negative net worth, but are in fact,
very valuable assets. Depreciation actually enhances the
value of real estate, since it shelters taxable income and
allows many public real estate companies to pay liquidating
dividends which are regarded as a return of capital to
investors, and are tax-free.
Analysts and investors have difficulty calculating the
actual performance of real estate investments or predicting
the value of potential investments. Profits result from
long-term increases in property values in combination with
tax savings. Thus, cash flows must be analyzed over the
entire holding period to generate an accurate measure of
total return. Predictions of future earnings and profits must
account for both tax effects and capital appreciation, both of
which are uncertain and usually undervalued.[12]
To accurately evaluate a real estate company, the analyst
needs data on a company's portfolio, including the cash flows
and current value of each property. Analysts' valuation of
properties must usually rely on estimates by appraisers who
are typically retained by the company being evaluated. Unlike
more generic products, each piece of real estate is a unique
commodity and has its own individual characteristics and
locational attributes. Since real estate is traded
infrequently, data on "comparables" is hard to obtain and
appraised values can be difficult to substantiate. Market
quotations of real estate stocks frequently do not represent
the true value of a company, but are based on perceptions of
value. Real estate is an inefficient market, and detailed
knowledge and expertise is needed to properly evaluate a
company and its assets.
There have been some recent developments in the SEC
requirements which may lead to more accurate evaluation and
communication of the current value of real estate. In the
late '70s, the Rouse Company petitioned the SEC to be
permitted to publish current values along with book values.
For the first time, appraised values were reported to
shareholders in a real estate company's annual report.[1]
Current value is determined by three standard approaches:
replacement cost, comparables, or income approach. The
replacement cost approach, as its name implies, uses estimates
of the cost of reproducing a property to determine its value.
The comparables approach identifies similar properties which
have recently been sold, and estimates value by comparing
various attributes, such as construction quality and location.
The income approach capitalizes net operating income (NOI) by
a capitalization rate to determine value. When used together,
these three approaches give a fairly reliable estimate of
property value but cannot perfectly predict the price a
property would command if it was placed on the open market.
Current value reporting does allow investors to make more
accurate valuations of the company, and many other public
realty firms, such as the Koger Company and Perini Investment
Properties, have since adopted this practice.
In 1979, the Financial Accounting Services Board (FASB)
issued regulations requiring large public real estate
companies to disclose information on changing values, as
affected by inflation. FASB does not recognize appraised
values, but only inflation-adjusted values based on historical
cost. These constant dollar measurements do not accurately
reflect actual market values, since they make no adjustment
for specific property variables, but are more accurate than
book values. FASB contends that appraisals are not verifiable
or objective, and does not consider them appropriate
alternatives.[1] Current value reporting is allowed as
supplemental information, but is not required due to its
perceived lack of reliability.
Studies are currently underway to develop standard,
uniform practices for current value disclosures. According to
a recent Coopers and Lybrand Survey, real estate investment
analysts do not feel that present accounting methods account
for changing real estate values. This is a major contributing
factor to the widespread belief that real estate stocks are
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generally undervalued.[l] The uncertainties regarding earnings
potential and property values have a negative impact on stock
prices and may act as a deterrent to potential investors.
The Stock Issue and Dividend Policy
Another problem that the public real estate company must
contend with is the high cost of going public. The stock
issue is a complex and expensive process, involving high
administrative fees and underwriting costs. Once public,
companies must adhere to the SEC's requirements and
regulations and must answer to their stockholders. Public
companies are also faced with the threat of takeovers. This
is especially problematic for those companies whose stock is
undervalued in the marketplace. Many companies remain private
and raise capital through other means to avoid these
regulations and potential pitfalls.
Public companies are judged on the basis of stock
appreciation and dividend payouts. However, a large dividend
payout is not always an indication of a healthy company. Low
dividends may indicate that earnings are negligible. On the
other hand, they may signify that the company is retaining
earnings for expansion of its operations or the acquisition of
new properties. Conversely, high dividends may be distributed
when a company borrows heavily to finance its expenditures.
They may also be a product of the disposition of an
income-producing asset, and thus will be a one-time benefit
and may decrease future earnings.
One goal of many investment-oriented public real estate
companies, including the Koger Co. and Perini Investment
Properties, is the shelter of taxable earnings. If earnings
can be offset by losses generated through depreciation,
dividends paid out of cash flow will be considered a return of
capital. These "liquidating" dividends are not currently
taxable to shareholders as income, although they decrease the
investors' basis in the stock. When the stock is sold,
shareholders incur capital gains tax on the difference between
the selling price and their basis. Thus, liquidating
dividends offer the benefit of deferred taxation and the
conversion of ordinary income to capital gains. The 1986 Tax
Act eliminated the preferential status of capital gains, but
many believe that it will be reinstated.
ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC STRUCTURES
Mergers and Acquisitions
Many real estate companies in need of capital choose to
merge with other corporations, instead of forming an
independent public structure. This route has several
advantages: a large corporation provides security, access to
capital and credit lines, and liquidity. The acquiring
corporation gains a valuable asset, diversity, talent and
expertise, and an entry into the real estate business.[9]
For many entrepreneurial developers, however, the
conservative, corporate environment is an anathema.
Free-wheeling, independent personalities are incompatible with
most large corporate-style operations, and are not willing to
give up control over important decisions. Many of the mergers
of the '60s broke up as a result of internal management
problems caused by conflicts between the original owner of the
real estate entity and the corporate executives.
Several large conglomerates were at the forefront of the
'60s merger movement. Boise Cascade, the lumber company,
acquired six major real estate companies in the mid-'60s,
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) acquired giant
Levitt and Sons in 1968 (Levitt was already publicly-held),
and Inland Steel, American Standard, and Occidental Petroleum
also made major real estate acquisitions. Many of these
mergers failed. Often, the previous owners of the real estate
companies left within a few years, and moved onto new
challenges. Without this entrepreneurial talent and real
estate know-how, the real estate entity lost much of its
value. Many manufacturing corporations discovered that
conservative, finance-oriented operations were incompatible
with the fast-paced, entrepreneurial world of real estate
development.[9]
With some exceptions -- such as the acquisition of
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Mission Viejo by Philip Morris -- the successful mergers were
of the cogeneric type: developer/builders merging with other
developer/builders. Kaufman and Broad, U.S. Home, Leisure
Technology Corporation, and Centex Corporation all expanded in
the late '60s and early 70s by acquiring smaller real estate
companies. These acquisitions allowed them to diversify
geographically and by product type. By using the knowledge
and abilities of small, local developers, these companies
could expand more rapidly and create a synergy in which the
value of the expanded company was greater than the value of
all of its separate parts. These mergers were successful
because the acquiring company understood the real estate
business, as well as the motivations and personalities of the
acquired developers.[9]
Real Estate Investment Trust
Other forms of real estate securities also proliferated
in the '60s. The most significant of these was the real
estate investment trust (REIT). In 1960, legislation was
passed which allowed these "trusts" to pass earnings from real
estate investments directly to investors without incurring
income tax on the trust. (In contrast, corporations are taxed
before distributions and stockholders are taxed when dividends
are paid.) REITs provided an important source of capital for
development, and were often willing to fund risky projects
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that other lenders would not.[8]
REITs provide similar benefits -- liquidity and access to
capital -- to the public company, but have some inherent
differences. The REIT has clear tax advantages over the
corporation, but also has some limitations. Functions must be
separated; the tax status of a trust is jeopardized if it
provides operating and management services to the properties
in its portfolio. For a real estate entity, however, profits
are closely related to the quality of operations and
management and may not be optimized if close control is not
exercised. In addition, REITs are required to distribute 95%
of taxable income to their shareholders. This requirement
severely limits a firm's ability to take advantage of new
development opportunities, since capital cannot be retained.
Other limitations on the disposition of assets and
restrictions on ownership also make the REIT an inappropriate
vehicle for many real estate companies, especially those
engaged in development. In contrast, a public corporation is
able to retain earnings to fund new development and
acquisition and is not restricted by requirements governing
distribution and ownership.
The Master Limited Partnership
A master limited partnership (MLP) is a recent innovation
in the real estate securities industry which allows some
companies to realize the value of undervalued assets and pass
income and losses through directly to stockholders. The MLP
is a partnership which is traded on the stock market. Since
it is liquid, it is appealing to many investors who are
concerned about long-term involvement in risky real estate
ventures. Because it is a partnership, investors are.taxed on
cash distributions (in excess of capital contributed) but the
MLP entity incurs no taxes. Unlike the REIT, the MLP
structure allows tax losses to be passed through to the
limited partners, thus enhancing the value to the investor.
The first real estate MLP, Ala Moana Hawaii Properties,
was created in 1981 to liquidate the holdings of its parent
company, the Dillingham Corporation. Since then, about twenty
other real estate MLPs have been created to combine,
liquidate, or spin off real estate holdings. Limited partner
investors in MLPs find them attractive because they are
yield-oriented and provide liquidity. Under the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, they became especially attractive because income
from MLPs can be used to offset passive losses from other
investments.[18]
To qualify as a partnership for tax purposes, an MLP must
demonstrate that it does not have more corporate
characteristics -- such as centralization of management and
limited liability -- than noncorporate characteristics. These
restrictions limit the applicability of the MLP structure to
real estate. An additional problem with MLPs is the
complexity of the tax reporting and accounting requirements.
An MLP is required to report each sale or exchange of a
partnership interest to the IRS and identify the individual
investors. The regulations become even more onerous if the
partnership uses a Section 754 election which involves
adjusting the basis for each partnership interest traded.[18]
The MLP is an attractive structure for some real estate
entities and provides important tax advantages over both the
public company and the REIT. It offers many of the benefits
of the corporate structure, including liquidity and improved
access to capital markets. It also provides a means by which
real estate holdings can be consolidated or separated.
Onerous reporting requirements and the "noncorporate"
characteristic requirements have, until now, been the primary
drawback of this structure. However, a recent development --
the Revenue Act of 1987 -- has changed the outlook for MLPs.
As of December, 1987, new MLPs are taxed as corporations if
they don't meet passivity rules (which are similar to those
for REITs.) Existing MLPs are grandfathered, and have until
1995 to restructure.[4]
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THE TREND TOWARDS REAL ESTATE SECURITIZATION
The current trend towards the securitization of real
estate assets is driven by a large number of investors looking
for profitable investments which provide diversification and
growth potential as well as liquidity. Real estate has gained
the acceptance of the investor market in recent years, and
product innovations and the involvement of Wall Street have
increased the demand for securitized real estate.[20] The
public real estate company has a longer history than other
forms of real estate securities, and has retained its appeal
by providing a liquid asset which offers current income as
well as upside potential and is accessible to the small
investor. For real estate companies, securitization offers a
reliable, sustained source of financing. The public company
is an important segment of the real estate securities group
and provides a structure which is the best alternative for
many companies.
CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE RECORD
A number of studies comparing direct investment in equity
real estate with investments in common stocks have been
published. [13,15,19] However, little attention has been paid
to the historical performance of real estate stocks. Studies
of equity holdings in real estate have indicated that real
estate investments have historically provided returns
approximately equal to those of common stocks, while offering
lower volatility and risk. These findings contradict the
common belief that real estate is a risky investment offering
very high returns to a few fortunate investors. Although
equity ownership of real estate may not outperform the stock
market, the returns are less variable and therefore more
predictable. Furthermore, as part of an investor's portfolio,
real estate offers diversification. Because it is often
negatively correlated with the stock market -- when the market
is rising, real estate values are falling -- real estate
lowers the overall volatility of a portfolio. It also tends
to perform well during periods of rapid price escalations,
thus acting as an inflation hedge.[10]
On the other hand, one might expect the performance of
publicly-traded real estate companies to be more closely
correlated with the stock market. The return of public
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companies is determined by changes in share values together
with dividend payments. These returns do not necessarily
reflect changes in the underlying value of the real estate
assets. Therefore, real estate stock returns would be
expected to exhibit greater volatility than the return of
equity investment in real estate.
METHODOLOGY
Real estate firms frequently complain about
under-valuation of their stocks on the market. This problem,
combined with many investors' skepticism about real estate's
return and risk characteristics, would tend to have a negative
impact on the performance of real estate stocks. To analyze
the actual performance of real estate stocks, and challenge
the traditional assumptions, an analysis of twenty-six real
estate stocks was performed over the fifteen-year period from
1973-1988.
The companies included in the sample (see Exhibit 3) are
believed to be representative of the larger players in the
industry. Several criteria were used in selecting the firms
to be included in the sample. The companies must have had
total capitalization (debt plus equity) exceeding forty
million dollars, and have been listed in the 1987 edition of
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual. In addition, dividend data
and quarterly returns adjusted for stock splits must have been
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available from Trade Line for the period 1973 through 1988.
The sample includes both developer/builders and
operator/managers and is composed of fifteen homebuilders and
eleven commercial developers.
Three different types of analyses were used to examine
the performance of real estate companies. First, the returns
of realty firms were correlated with other types of
investments and macroeconomic factors to determine the
contribution of real estate stocks to overall portfolio
returns. Second, the risk and return characteristics were
analyzed on a quarterly basis over the fifteen-year period,
2:1973 to 1:1988. This analysis examines the performance of
real estate relative to the stock market. Third, the
performance was analyzed for various holding periods,
corresponding to different phases of the economic cycle. This
method also utilizes stock market comparisons, but allows a
more in-depth study of the characteristics of the real estate
security during recessionary and expansionary periods. It
also permits analysis of the change in performance over time.
After analyzing the entire sample of twenty-six
companies, the group was divided into two segments: fifteen
homebuilders (developer/builders) and eleven commercial
developers (investor/managers). (Exhibit 4) Although some
commercial developers do not retain their projects as
revenue-producing assets, but sell them to generate short-term
earnings, it is believed that those companies included in this
category derive a substantial portion of their revenues from
the cash flow generated from rents, appreciation, and tax
savings. In contrast, the homebuilders generally derive
income from the sale of their real estate assets. Many
analysts and observers believe that the public form of
ownership is more suitable for developer/builders than
commercial developers, because earnings can be quickly
reflected on balance sheets and the value of the company can
be easily communicated to the market. This study compares the
two groups of real estate companies, and examines differences
in financial performance.
MEASURES OF INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE
Correlation of Realty Stock Returns
Correlation coefficients between the returns of real
estate stocks and other investment classes were examined to
determine the congruence of real estate companies with other
investments. The portfolio diversification potential of an
investment is determined by its correlation with other assets,
as well as the asset's own intrinsic risk. Macroeconomic
factors also influence the pricing of publicly-traded
securities; thus, correlations between the realty stocks and
the CPI were also examined.
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Exhibit 5
CORRELATION OF REAL ESTATE STOCK RETURNS
WITH OTHER INVESTMENT CLASSES AND MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P L-T Fed.
Portfolio 500 Bonds T-bill Funds CPI
------------- ---- ------- ------- ------- -------
Consolidated 0.758 -0.114 -0.173 -0.234 -0.135
Builder 0.725 -0.137 -0.182 -0.223 -0.105
Investor 0.774 -0.168 -0.161 -0.232 -0.232
--------------------------------------------------------
Source: Trade Line, Business Conditions Digest, Standard &
Poors
Correlation coefficients were estimated from regressions
of the returns of each alternate investment or indicator
against the returns of the three portfolios over the
fifteen-year period. Positive correlation coefficients
indicate that returns tend to move together, while negative
coefficients indicate movement in opposite directions. A
coefficient of zero would indicate that there is no relation
between investments; a coefficient of positive or negative one
would indicate perfect correlation. Diversification benefits
are achieved when two investments are negatively
correlated.[2] The highest positive correlations are between
real estate stocks and the S&P 500 index; the lowest negative
coefficients are found between the federal funds rate and the
real estate company portfolios. This indicates that the stock
returns of both homebuilders and commercial real estate
companies fluctuate in a similar manner to the returns of the
S&P 500 index. It also suggests that real estate companies
are sensitive to interest rates and perform best when interest
rates are falling. Potential for portfolio diversification
exists for the investor whose portfolio contains both stocks
and long term corporate bonds or treasury bills, but real
estate stocks do not appear to provide diversification for
holders of S&P stocks.
Risk and Return
The return of a security is composed of both appreciation
(the change in share price divided by the previous period's
share price) and income (dividend) yields. Two measures of
return were used to analyze the performance of the sample
companies: arithmetic and geometric returns. The arithmetic
return is the annualized average of the quarterly rates of
return for each company. The geometric return is a
time-weighted compounded measure of return. It measures the
cumulative return, and is impacted by the variability of the
quarterly returns. A high standard deviation will lower the
geometric return. The arithmetic return is not impacted by
the variation of returns, and is therefore a less useful
measure of performance.
Measures of risk are important because they form the
basis for judging the performance of a security. Following
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), risk is composed of
two parts: systematic and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk
is the nondiversifiable, market-related risk which is measured
by the beta coefficient of a security. A beta of 1.0 is the
average market risk; a beta greater than 1.0 indicates
sensitivity to market movements and a beta less than 1.0
indicates insensitivity to changes in the market.[2]
Unsystematic, or firm-specific risk is the portion that is
related to the individual company. Unsystematic risk can be
eliminated if the investor holds a relatively large portfolio
(typically defined as over twenty securities.) High systematic
risk indicates that the security is positively correlated with
the stock market and business cycle and may not provide
diversification potential.[7]
The analysis to follow is based on CAPM theory which
explains the relationship between expected return on a
security and its related risk. CAPM asserts that the expected
risk premium should vary in direct proportion to market
risk.[2] The theory specifies a simple linear relationship
between risk and return.
The investment performance of stocks can be examined in
the risk-return context by using a data series of historical
returns. By regressing the excess return2 of a security
against the excess return of the capital market index
(Standard & Poors' 500), one can estimate the intercept term
or risk-adjusted return (a), and the slope coefficient or
estimate of beta (b). The risk-adjusted return was calculated
for each company, and for the consolidated portfolio of
equally-weighted stocks, and the homebuilder and commercial
portfolios.
The results are shown in Exhibit 7, with risk-adjusted
returns for the period 1973 to 1988. The results of the
regression equation showed a good statistical fit; all stocks
except Southmark Corp. had T-statistics greater than 2.0.
On average, the S&P 500 explained 57.5% (R 2) of the total
variation in the quarterly returns. It explained 52.5% of the
developer/builders' stocks' variation, and 60.1% of the
investment/management companies' variation. The average
quarterly excess return was 1.8%, or about 7.4% annualized.
All companies except four evidenced excess returns, indicating
that investors in real estate stocks are well-compensated for
bearing a relatively high level of risk. The high
risk-adjusted returns contradict the CAPM theory, since the
returns are higher than can be justified by the risk premium.
This suggests that the market for real estate stocks is not
efficient, possibly due to a lack of information or education
of investors.
The sample of fifteen homebuilders has a higher beta and
a lower R2 than the sample of eleven commercial real estate
companies. These findings suggest that the
developer/builders' returns are more sensitive to market
movements and that a lower percentage of their variation in
returns can be explained by the S&P's variation. In other
words, the homebuilders' returns may be more sensitive to
factors which have less impact on industrial stocks and stocks
of commercial real estate companies. The homebuilder sample
also has a higher average risk-adjusted return, suggesting
that the market for homebuilders' stocks is less efficient
than the market for investment real estate stocks. This
finding is surprising, since the valuation of
builder/developer companies is fairly straightforward relative
to the valuation of investment-oriented real estate companies.
However, the relatively small size of the sub-samples could
produce biased results.
The relationship between the S&P 500 and the sample of
real estate companies is shown graphically in Exhibit 8. The
patterns of returns are synchronous, but the real estate
companies exhibit a greater amplitude of cyclical fluctuation.
This can be explained, in part, by the much larger size and
greater diversity of the stock market sample. It may also be
explained by the composition of returns. 94% of the average
quarterly returns of the real estate companies' are in the
form of stock appreciation. In contrast, the S&P 500 index
shows an average appreciation component of 64% over the
fifteen year period. (see Exhibit 6) The income (dividend)
component tends to be more stable than the appreciation
component, therefore the S&P is subject to lower volatility of
total returns.
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Exhibit 6
MEASURES of VARIATION and COMPOSITION of RETURNS
Quarterly Average 2:73-1:88
Average Quarterly Returns
Total Apprec. Income Std.Dev.
Real Estate Companies
-Consolidated 5.88% 5.51% 0.37% 21.59%
-Homebuilders 6.21% 5.94% 0.27% 25.93%
-Commercial Cos. 5.38% 4.90% 0.48% 17.82%
S & P 500 3.12% 1.99% 1.13% 9.22%
Source: Trade Line, Standard & Poors
The homebuilder companies exhibit more volatility than
the commercial companies. This may be explained by the
different orientations of the two segments of the industry.
Commercial companies are investment-oriented. They tend to
hold properties which generate cash flow through lease
payments. Tenants of office and retail space typically have
three to five year leases, thus cash flows are fairly stable,
except in a prolonged recession or in a severely overbuilt
market. In contrast, homebuilders are very vulnerable to the
economy's upswings and downswings. Profits are contingent
upon a high volume of home sales, and there are few housing
starts in periods of high interest rates or recessions. Some
homebuilders have diversified into the apartment sector of the
residential market; these tend to have more consistent
returns. As shown above in Table x, income is a larger
percentage of the total return for investment-oriented
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companies. Because income is more stable, consistent
dividends can be paid to investors, and stock returns are less
volatile.
The amount of leverage may also have a significant impact
on the volatility of a company's returns. Companies which are
highly leveraged are more risky, and are sensitive to changes
in interest rates. Most real estate companies carry a
significant amount of debt (Exhibit 3), thus high volatility
is not surprising. [See Exhibit 9 for individual company
returns.]
Holding Period Returns
Returns for both the S&P 500 index and the portfolio of
real estate companies were examined for various holding
periods between 1973 and 1988. This fifteen-year time span
encompasses two major recessions, 1974-1975 and 1981-1982.
The minor, two-quarter, recession of 1980 was omitted from the
holding period analysis, as its magnitude and duration were
not sufficient to produce significant variation in returns.
The standard deviation of the consolidated portfolio is
more than twice that of the S&P index for the fifteen-year
period. This measure of the volatility of investment returns
is consistently greater for the real estate portfolio over all
holding periods examined. An inspection of the actual returns
-- Exhibits 10 and 11 -- for these holding periods indicates
dramatic fluctuations in returns from upswing to downswing for
both the S&P and the portfolio. The variation, as expected,
is much more extreme for the real estate companies.
Although a high degree of volatility for real estate
companies does not come as a surprise, it is interesting to
examine the change in volatility over time. The standard
deviation during the 1974-1975 recession is more than twice
that for the 1981-1982 recession. Likewise, the standard
deviations for the upswing and downswing periods of the '70s
were much higher than those for the corresponding periods of
the '80s. This can be explained, in part, by the severity of
the recessions and magnitude of recovery. The '70s was a
decade of high interest rates and inflation, and an
examination of the S&P 500 index also shows greater volatility
of returns during this period. The portfolio of real estate
companies, however, appears to have become less volatile
relative to the S&P index in recent years. During the '70s,
for both upswing and downswing periods, the standard deviation
of real estate companies was about three times that of the S&P
500 index. During the '80s, the standard deviation was about
one-and-a-half times that of the S&P, suggesting that real
estate companies have become less volatile, relative to other
companies, over time.
This phenomenon may be explained by several factors.
First, all companies in the sample are at least fifteen years
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old. As firms mature, they typically become more diversified
and therefore less risky. Older companies are usually larger,
and risk a smaller percentage of their equity on each new
venture. Experienced personnel may also lower the risk, and
volatility, of a company's performance.
An examination of the composition of returns suggests a
second reason for the increasing stability of real estate
stocks. The income component has become a larger component of
the total return in the 1980s. Although dividend payments
still account for only about 10% of the return, they appear to
be more significant than during earlier periods. Since
dividends are often paid even when a stock is not appreciating
in value, a larger income component tends to produce less
volatile returns.
A third factor which may be contributing to the decrease
in the volatility of real estate stock returns is a change in
the market for these stocks. If the market is becoming
"educated" about real estate investments, it may tend to place
more emphasis on the underlying real estate assets when
evaluating a company. Since these values -- with some notable
exceptions -- are not typically subject to severe
fluctuations, a reduction in volatility could be expected.
The size and type of investor also impacts the volatility of a
stock. When many of a company's shares are held by a few
large investors, trading can be erratic and influence the
volatility of stock prices.
Macroeconomic factors may also affect the variability of
public real estate firms' returns, as may changes in tax laws,
housing policy, and other government policies.
These explanations for the decrease in real estate
stocks' volatility are hypothetical; a more detailed study of
each company, as well as more recent entries to the real
estate company industry, would be needed to verify these
conjectures.
Exhibit 7
REGRESSION STATISTICS AND RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS 2:73-1:88
risk-
adjusted
return
Market Return - S & P 500 index
Portfolio of 26 companies
Homebuilder portfolio
Commercial portfolio
HOMEBUILDERS
AMREP Corp
Centex Corp.
Christiana Companies Inc.
FPA Corp.
Horizon Corp.
Kaufman & Broad
Leisure Technology Inc.
Lennar Corp.
Major Realty Corp.
Oriole Homes Corp.
Parkway Co.
Pulte Home Corp.
Punta Gorda Isles Inc.
Ryland Group Inc.
Webb (Del E.) Corp.
0.018
0.020
0.015
0.025
0.009
0.022
0.006
0.001
0.011
0.001
0.042
0.038
0.016
0.022
0.077
-0.016
0.033
0.017
beta
1.000
1.772
2.034
1.493
1.546
1.943
1.915
1.313
1.293
2.652
2.284
2.829
1.103
2.155
1.103
2.733
2.111
2.621
1.884
RA2
0.575
0.525
0.601
0.280
0.475
0.241
0.243
0.138
0.496
0.339
0.457
0.083
0.346
0.073
0.337
0.384
0.530
0.310
COMMERCIAL COS.
Bay Financial Corp. -0.001 1.353 0.192
British Land of America Inc. -0.011 1.794 0.202
Cousins Properties Inc. 0.033 1.348 0.226
Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 0.011 1.770 0.434
Koger Properties Inc. 0.012 1.744 0.339
New Mexico & Arizona Land 0.005 1.595 0.421
Northview Corp. 0.046 0.707 0.064
Rouse Co. 0.015 1.657 0.482
Servico, Inc. 0.029 1.343 0.312
Sonesta Interntl. Hotels Corp. 0.054 1.304 0.297
Southmark Corp. -0.020 1.829 0.367
Note: T statististics for all companies except Southmark are
greater than 2.0
Source: Trade Line, IDD Information Services, 1988
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Exhibit 9
QUARTERLY RETURNS FOR REAL ESTATE COMPANIES 2:73 - 2:88
--------------------------------------------------------
Quarterly Standard Coeff. of
Average Deviation Variation
--------------------------------------------------------
PORTFOLIO
S&P 500 3.12% 9.22% 2.96
Consolidated 5.88% 21.58% 3.67
Homebuilders 6.21% 25.93% 4.18
Commercial 5.38% 17.82% 3.31
HOMEBUILDERS
AMREP Corp. 5.78% 27.33% 4.73
Centex Corp. 5.45% 26.20% 4.81
Christiana Cos. 6.27% 35.94% 5.73
FPA Corp. 4.23% 24.66% 5.83
Horizon Corp. 3.26% 32.14% 9.86
Kaufman & Broad 6.01% 26.31% 4.38
Leisure Technology Inc. 4.37% 36.15% 8.27
Lennar Corp. 9.26% 38.63% 4.17
Major Realty Corp. 6.65% 35.34% 5.31
Oriole Homes Corp. 6.11% 33.81% 5.53
Parkway Co. 5.30% 37.78% 7.13
Pulte Home Corp. 12.41% 43.51% 3.51
Punta Gorda Isles Inc. 2.36% 31.46% 13.33
Ryland Group Inc. 8.18% 33.20% 4.06
Webb (Del E.) Corp. 6.41% 28.23% 4.40
COMMERCIAL COS.
Bay Financial Corp. 3.28% 28.50% 8.69
British Land of America 3.20% 36.67% 11.46
Cousins Properties 6.96% 26.21% 3.77
Forest City Enterprises 5.50% 24.86% 4.52
Koger Properties 5.32% 27.62% 5.19
New Mexico & Arizona Land 4.42% 22.95% 5.19
Northview Corp. 7.14% 25.80% 3.61
Rouse Co. 5.45% 21.99% 4.03
Servico, Inc. 6.29% 22.14% 3.52
Sonesta Interntl. Hotels 8.73% 22.05% 2.53
Southmark Corp. 2.58% 28.10% 10.89
Mean 5.80% 29.91% 5.94
---------------------------------------------------
Source: Trade Line
Exhibit 10
HOLDING PERIOD ANALYSIS
ANNUALIZED RETURNS FOR PORTFOLIO OF 26 REAL ESTATE COMPANIES
--- -------------------------------------------------------
COEFF.
TIME PERIOD TOTAL APPR. INCOME EXCESS of VAR.
--- -------------------------------------------------------
AVERAGE ANNUAL RETURN
3/73-2/88 25.70% 23.95%
GEOMETRIC RETURN
3/73-2/88
Business Cycle
Peak-Trough
4/73-1/75
3/81-4/82
Recession
1/74-1/75
3/81-4/82
Downswing (P-T)
4/73-1/75
3/81-4/82
Upswing (T-P)
1/75-2/81
4/82-2/88
Cycle
Peak-Peak
4/73-2/81
2/81-2/88
Trough-Trough
1/75-4/82
4/82-2/88
15.91% 14.09%
-34.74% -38.06%
11.66% 10.01%
-17.35% -19.30%
11.66% 10.01%
-34.74% -38.06%
11.66% 10.01%
49.50% 47.97%
17.20% 15.78%
18.95% 16.77%
11.54% 10.12%
43.14% 41.49%
17.20% 15.78%
1.75% 16.34% 1.834
1.81% 5.48% 1.834
3.31% -40.38% -8.217
1.65% -1.72% 2.124
1.94% -24.22% 6.571
1.65% -1.72% 2.124
3.31% -40.38%
1.65% -1.72%
1.54% 38.83%
1.42% 5.40%
-8.217
2.124
0.930
1.431
2.18% 9.65% 1.749
1.42% 2.52% 1.918
1.64% 31.23%
1.42% 5.40%
1.038
1.431
Source: Trade Line, IDD Information Services, 1988
Exhibit 11
HOLDING PERIOD ANALYSIS
ANNUALIZED RETURNS FOR S&P 500 INDEX
--- ----------------------------------------------------
COEFF.
TIME PERIOD TOTAL APPR. INCOME EXCESS of VAR
--- ----------------------------------------------------
AVERAGE ANNUAL RETURN
3/73-2/88 13.10%
GEOMETRIC RETURN
3/73-2/88 11.21%
8.20% 4.90% 4.20% 1.478
6.36% 4.85% 2.55% 1.478
Business Cycle
Peak-Trough
4/73-1/75
3/81-4/82
Recession
1/74-1/75
3/81-4/82
Downswing (P-T)
4/73-1/75
3/81-4/82
Upswing (T-P)
1/75-2/81
4/82-2/88
Cycle
Peak-Peak
4/73-2/81
2/81-2/88
Trough-Trough
1/75-4/82
4/82-2/88
-12.05% -16.08%
10.84% 4.71%
-7.32% -11.67%
10.84% 4.71%
-12.05% -16.08%
10.84% 4.71%
15.80% 10.51%
18.48% 14.24%
4.03% -18.78% -3.689
6.12% -0.98% 1.612
4.35% -14.38%-14.026
6.12% -0.98% 1.612
4.03% -18.78% -3.689
6.12% -0.98% 1.612
5.29% 6.92% 0.958
4.24% 10.61% 0.935
7.44% 2.50% 4.95% -0.91% 2.059
13.86% 9.29% 4.58% 5.03% 1.195
14.85% 9.40%
18.48% 14.24%
5.45% 5.39% 1.064
4.24% 10.61% 0.935
Source: Business Conditions Digest, 1988
CHAPTER IV.
CASE STUDIES
Three companies were chosen to illustrate the advantages
and disadvantages of the public structure for an
investment/management- oriented real estate company. This
segment of the industry was selected for the case study
analysis because it is most affected by the accounting
valuation problem. Two of the three companies -- Perini
Investment Properties (PIP) and the Koger Company (TKC) --
were formed by spinning off the investment, cash-flow oriented
business from the development, earnings-oriented business.
Bay Financial Corporation was originally a real estate
investment trust, and has retained both development and
property management in one corporation. Returns for the three
companies are shown in the following table for the period 3:84
through 2:88. A more detailed examination of Bay Financial's
and Koger's performance since 1973 is presented in Exhibits 17
and 18. (Perini Investment Properties has only been in
existence since 1984.)
Exhibit 12
AVERAGE QUARTERLY RETURNS 3:84-2:88
---- ---------------------------------------- 
----------------
Std. Coeff.of
Total Appr. Income Dev. Variation
------------------------------------------------
Perini 3.20% 2.80% 0.40% 10.30% 3.21
Bay Financial 
-0.14% -0.32% 0.18% 13.90% -100.48
Koger 4.09% 1.90% 2.20% 6.90% 1.68
------------------------------------------------
Source: Trade Line
PERINI INVESTMENT PROPERTIES
Background
The Perini Corporation was originally a family-held
construction company specializing in heavy construction,
particularly roads, bridges, and high rise buildings.3 Perini
went public to provide liquidity for the Perini family and to
raise capital to fund projects. In the late '50s, Perini had
become involved with the development of West Palm Beach, a new
Florida community. The development of new communities can be
especially problematic for real estate companies, since it
requires a large influx of capital in the early stages of the
project, and profits are not realized for many years. By
1960, Perini had sunk twenty million dollars into the project;
this money was raised through loans and internally generated
through the construction business. Perini's lenders became
very nervous about the extent to which their resources and
those of the company had been committed to this project, and
pressured Perini to go public. This coincided with the need
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to break up the family estate, and in 1961, Perini became a
public company.
Perini continued its development activities at West Palm
Beach, but until the mid '70s, the company's real estate
operations remained a "stepchild". Real estate had never made
money, and the company's investment in the Golden Gateway
Center in San Francisco exacerbated the problems. This
mixed-use project, which was begun in the mid '60s, suffered
large losses and illustrated the inherent problems with the
real estate operations at Perini. In general, Perini's real
estate assets were poorly managed, earnings were not
maximized, and the company had no portfolio strategy. In
1974, Perini almost decided to get out of the real estate
business, and devote all of its resources to the construction
operations. First, however, management decided to attempt to
salvage the real estate division.
Tom Steele, current Chief Executive Officer of Perini
Investment Properties, identified the two major
characteristics of Perini's real estate division in the mid
'70s. It had very valuable assets, but a weak organization.
Steele decided that the company had to be reorganized, and
devised a strategy for optimizing the value of all of the
company's assets. In the '70s, all of Perini's assets, from
apartment buildings to construction equipment, were held in
the same corporation. Steele realized that these assets had
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to be split up, so that cash flow-oriented assets could be
separated from earnings-oriented assets. At that point,
income properties were "getting lost in the corporate balance
sheet" and were grossly undervalued. To solve this dilemma,
the company decided to concentrate on generating earnings
through developing and building properties for sale, rather
than investing in income properties for the long term.
By the early '80s, management was reconsidering this
decision. Steele and others felt that the exclusion of
investment properties would limit the growth opportunities of
the company. They also felt that this policy resulted in the
underutilization of some of the key personnel's experience in
asset management. They decided to create a new public company
by "spinning off" the cash-flow business, represented by the
company's interests in the Golden Gateway Center, the Alcoa
Building, (a 25-story office building in San Francisco) and
some commercial/industrial buildings in Massachusetts.
Organization
This new company, Perini Investment Properties (PIP), was
formed in 1984 to maximize the market's valuation of the real
estate assets and enhance shareholders' value. Previously,
the market did not know how to value Perini's investment
properties and did not understand how they fit in with the
company's primary businesses of construction and development.
When the separation of the cash-flow oriented business -- PIP
-- was announced, the market substantiated management's
assessment that the companies would be worth more when
separated. Before the spin-off, Perini Company's stock had
been trading at $28 per share. After this event, Perini
Corporation's stock still traded at $28, and PIP's stock
traded at $12, for an overall increase of 43%. At that
time, 3.2 million shares were outstanding; therefore, the
total market valuation increased by $38 million.[22]
Perini considered other structures for its investment
holdings, including the REIT and the master limited
partnership (MLP). Management determined that the REIT was
not an appropriate vehicle, because of the passive management
regulations, and the SEC rules requiring distribution of 95%
of taxable income. In addition, the creation of a REIT may
have been considered a taxable event, whereas the division of
assets and formation of a new company was not. The MLP
structure was also considered, but the heavy record-keeping
requirements were a drawback. Perini executives also felt
that a change in the tax status of the MLP was imminent, and
feared that the partnership, if created, would be taxed as a
corporation. In retrospect, Steele concedes that they were
wrong on the timing (since the tax regulations have just
recently been changed) but correct about the long-term effect.
After much consideration and reflection, Perini
determined that a public operating real estate company was the
best vehicle for holding its investment properties. It was
the most flexible, and allowed the company to retain cash flow
to fund its operations and new acquisitions. The shareholders
also benefitted because the spin-off was considered a
non-taxable distribution. The assets of Perini Corporation
were divided; each shareholder retained his/her old shares in
this company and gained new shares in PIP. Shareholders
retained their old basis, and thus would pay capital gains tax
when the shares were sold, instead of being taxed on ordinary
income from distributions.
Performance
PIP's performance in the last four-and-one-half years has
been quite strong, averaging 14.33% per year. Returns have
been stable during this period, with a standard deviation of
10.3%. The biggest hurdle that PIP faced after becoming a
separate entity was communicating the true value of the
company to shareholders and market analysts. PIP convinced
the SEC, after much negotiation, to allow the company to
report cash flow per share, as well as earnings per share.
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Exhibit 13
PERINI INVESTMENT PROPERTIES
Cash Flow and Earnings per Share
-----------------------------------------------------------
1987 1986 1985 1984 1983
-----------------------------------------------------------
Net Cash
Flow/Share $1.14 $1.00 $0.80 $0.69 $0.92
Earnings/Share ($1.58) ($0.44) ($0.08) $0.57 $0.79
Dividends paid on
Common Stock $0.57 $0.48 $0.20 $0.20 na
-----------------------------------------------------------
Source: 1987, 1985 Annual Reports
In its annual report, PIP presents a side-by-side balance
sheet showing current market value of its properties along
with book value. The appraised value of the properties less
outstanding debt less deferred taxes yields a current value
net worth number which represents liquidation value. This
number is divided by the number of shares outstanding to
calculate net equity per share. The objective of these
unorthodox accounting procedures is to equate market price per
share with net current value per share. PIP, like most public
real estate companies, trades at a substantial discount from
this number.
Exhibit 14
PERINI INVESTMENT PROPERTIES
Discount to Net Current Value (as of December 31)
--------------------------------------------------------
1987 1986 1985 1984 1983
--------------------------------------------
Shareholders' Net Equity
-Cost Basis (3,612) 4,448 7,300 (7,058) 846
-Current Value 101,494 94,290 84,223 57,475 58,317
Basis
Shares Outst'g 4,304 4,371 4,373 3,292 3,233
Price/Share 15.38 14.25 11.50 11.63 na
---- ------- ------- ------- ------
Capitalization 66,174 62,287 50,290 38,270 na
Market-to-Current Value
as % of Equity 65.20% 66.06% 59.71% 66.58% na
--------------------------------------------
Source: 1987 Annual Report, Trade Line
The fact that the underlying value is still not reflected
in the marketplace makes PIP, and other undervalued real
estate companies, a target for takeovers. In May, 1987, an
investor group led by Robert Goodman approached PIP with an
offer to buy the company at $21 a share. This offer was
rejected, as was a new offer in April, 1988, of $19 a share.
Goodman owned 7.4% of the 3.26 million shares, but the Perini
family had a 30% controlling interest in the company.[5] PIP
called its convertible preferred stock in April, and bought
back about one-third of the 1.03 million shares. The
remaining two-thirds of the preferred stockholders converted
their shares to common stock, with expectations of further
appreciation. Many of the shareholders are interested in
long-term appreciation, in keeping with the objectives of the
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company, but others would welcome a short-term gain. If the
latter group sells to Goodman, a hostile takeover may be
possible. In PIP's case, however, a takeover attempt would
probably be thwarted by the family's controlling interests.
Current Status
PIP's stock is currently trading at $18 a share, or about
76% of asset value. PIP is continually working to equalize
net current value with market value. The value is currently
not reflected in the marketplace because of two factors.
First, the stock sells at a high multiple of cash flow. As
the company matures, it should be able to generate higher cash
flow relative to the current value of its properties, become
more profitable, and increase dividends. Second, the company
is discounted because liquidation value may not always equal
net current value. Current value is determined by appraisals,
which are not generally recognized as accurate, reliable
estimates of fair market value.
PIP is currently trying to increase cash flow per share
by restructuring its portfolio through tax-free exchanges. In
the future, it hopes to narrow the gap and achieve parity with
net current value. In the short term, however, cash flow may
decrease as new properties are acquired and the portfolio is
diversified. PIP's assets are currently concentrated heavily
in the San Francisco area and the office market. By
diversifying geographically, and by product type, the outlook
for the long-term health of the company will be enhanced.
A temporary decrease in cash flow should be offset, in
the long run, by a better balanced, less risky portfolio of
assets which will maintain its value. Steele believes that
many of PIP's shareholders have some understanding of real
estate and are interested in long-term appreciation rather
than short-term gains. For this reason, they are willing to
tolerate a temporary dip in cash flow and earnings in return
for enhanced value in the future.
BAY FINANCIAL CORPORATION
Background
In 1971, Cabot, Cabot, and Forbes (CC&F) formed a real
estate investment trust with eight properties.4 This trust
operated for about six years, and was engaged primarily in
land acquisitions, land purchase-leasebacks, and development
loan financing. By 1976, management at the CC&F Land Trust
had become dissatisfied with the REIT structure. Shares in
the trust, which had been trading at $29 in 1973, had fallen
to $1.5 in 1976, following the recession of 1973-1974. To
maximize the potential of the trust's land holdings, they felt
that more active involvement was required. Passive management
regulations governing REITs prevented the trust from providing
operating and management services to the properties in its
portfolio. In addition, key personnel were convinced that
involvement in the development process would allow them to
realize higher profits, since this business provides the
greatest value added. In 1977, the CC&F Land Trust
disqualified as a REIT. In 1978, the name was changed to Bay
Colony Property Company, and the relationship with CC&F was
discontinued. The company's decision to go into the
development business was an easy one: it owned land, and
wanted to maximize profits.
Organization
The corporation was organized as a parent company, Bay
Financial, with two subsidiaries: Bay Colony Properties (BCP)
and Bay Colony Development (BCD). Separate entities were
formed to insulate each from potential problems of the other
and to separate the development business from the operations
and management division. Bay Financial currently develops,
owns, and operates properties and attempts to maximize cash
flows and long-term appreciation.
In 1980, Bay Financial reformulated its strategy and
developed a business plan: seven target markets -- Boston,
Philadelphia, Washington D.C., Atlanta, Jacksonville, Phoenix,
and Dallas -- were identified, and a goal of a 20% compounded
growth rate was established. The geographic decisions were
based on the market knowledge of Bay Colony's managers,
locations of properties in its current portfolio, market
forecasts, and a desire for diversification. The company also
decided to diversify by product type, since it wanted to make
the highest and best use of the land in its portfolio. Bay
Colony currently develops and operates residential, office,
and industrial buildings, as well as hotels. It still has
substantial holdings of undeveloped land, and a number of
projects in construction.
Performance
Bay Financial's performance over the last fifteen years
has been weak; of the twenty-six companies in the sample
study, Bay Financial was one of four with negative
risk-adjusted quarterly returns. (Exhibit 7) In other words,
investors were not compensated for the risk of their
investment. A more detailed examination of the company's
performance is presented in Exhibit 17. Returns have been very
volatile, and were lower than the returns of the consolidated
portfolio for all periods studied. Bay Financial did
particularly poorly during the early to mid-70s. At this
time, it was still a REIT. The company's performance appears
to be improving, and may show greater improvement as more
projects are built and leased and the company achieves closer
parity with the current value of its assets.
Bay Financial has encountered similar problems to those
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of Perini Investment Properties, and other public real estate
operating companies. Management is constantly trying to close
the gap between fair market value and shareholders' value.
Andrew Neher, Chief Financial Officer, explained that Bay
Financial's situation is particularly problematic because a
large portion of its portfolio is composed of properties in
various stages of lease-up, projects under construction, and
raw land holdings. The company does not have a strong track
record of completed projects, and thus the future value of its
portfolio is very difficult to establish. Attempts to
convince the public to "buy the future" can be successful for
a mature company, such as the Rouse Company, but Bay Financial
is currently trading at $16.25 per share, or less than 50% of
the appraised value of its assets. Cash flow per share is not
reported, since 83% of Bay Financial's investments are
non-income producing. Included in the non-income producing
category are fourteen projects (44% of total investments) on
which construction is complete and leasing is underway. An
additional 7% of Bay Financial's investments are currently
under construction. The remaining 32% of non-income
producing investments is primarily land holdings. Cash flow
should improve, as projects currently in the lease-up and
construction phases become income-producing assets.
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Exhibit 15
BAY FINANCIAL CORPORATION
Discount to Net Current Value (as of May 31)
---- ----------------------- -----------------------------
1987 1986 1985 1984 1983
---------------------------------~~ ----------------
Shareholders' Net Equity
-Cost Basis 53,448 62,205 58,000 56,578 47,254
-Current Value 132,523 151,448 130,678 105,129 82,273
Basis
Shares Outst'g 3,354 3,351 3,185 3,097 3,174
Price/Share $22.50 $24.63 $23.00 $19.50 $14.00
--------------- ------- ------- ------ -------
Capitalization 75,465 82,535 73,255 60,392 44,436
Market-to-Current Value
as % of Equity 56.94% 54.50% 56.06% 57.45% 54.01%
-- -------------------------------------- 
--------------
Source: 1987 Annual Report
Bay Financial is a prime takeover target by those who
believe that its assets are substantially undervalued by the
market. In 1986, Country and New Town Properties (CNTP), a
British company interested in acquiring property in the United
States, bought 20% of the company's shares from Paragon, a
Texas investor. CNTP subsequently increased its share in the
company to 42%. CNTP was recently bought by the Pennant
Corporation, an Australian company, which now controls 49% of
the stock. An additional 46% of Bay Financial's stock is
owned by two other corporate investors: the Depository Trust
Company and Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. Neher attests to
the difficulties of operating a public real estate operating
company which suffers from the discount problem, and is an
easy victim in an asset-hungry market.
Current Status
In the past few years, Bay Financial's managers have
often considered the idea of taking the company private.
Neher gave two primary reasons for his discontent with the
public structure. First, the investing public has a
short-term view, and demands consistent results, and high
earnings/share. As a consequence, the market substantially
undervalues the company, and it becomes an easy takeover
target. Second, the corporate structure is not compatible
with the development business. According to Neher,
entrepreneurial project managers cannot be compensated with a
piece of the project they develop because it is owned by the
company's stockholders. In addition, corporate managers spend
a substantial amount of their time dealing with reporting
requirements, takeover attempts, and other activities which
detract from their ability to focus on the real estate
development and management business. For Bay Financial, the
public structure has been "a constant battle that we shouldn't
be in." (Neher)
Bay Financial is currently analyzing alternate
structures. One plan under consideration would involve
converting the operating properties in its portfolio to a
REIT. The company could then concentrate on the investment
advisor business, and be a private developer of other
projects.
THE KOGER COMPANY
Background
The Koger Co. dates back to 1895, when the O.P. Woodcock
Company was formed.5 Woodcock was a general contractor and
developer in Jacksonville, Florida and was acquired by Ira
Koger in 1954. In the late '50s, Koger entered the
development business and opened the first suburban office park
in the United States. Since that time, Koger has been
exclusively involved with the development, ownership and
management of suburban, mid-rise office buildings in the
southeast and southwest.
Koger Properties Ltd., a Florida limited partnership,
merged with Woodcock in 1969, to form Koger Properties Inc., a
public corporation. In 1976, Koger sponsored a limited
partnership, the Koger Partnership, Ltd. to purchase completed
buildings in Koger office parks. This partnership currently
owns 87 buildings, and has over 4,300 limited partners. The
partnership was designed as a pure real estate investment, and
provides tax-sheltered cash distributions to its investors.
In 1980, Koger restructured its operations, spinning off
a new entity, the Koger Company (TKC), as an operating real
estate portfolio. This restructuring allowed Koger to
separate its earnings-oriented construction and development
business from its cash flow-oriented property management and
ownership business. Koger transferred 136 completed and fully
leased office buildings to TKC in 1980, and a separately-owned
corporation was formed. Prior to the restructuring, Koger's
stock was trading at about $24 a share; by the first quarter
of 1983, the aggregate value had almost doubled: Koger was
selling at $23.50 a share and TKC for $23.34. As with Perini,
the market confirmed that the development and operating
divisions were worth more separated than together.
Organization
These three separate entities give the investor a choice
in levels of risk and return. The construction/development
company (Koger) is the most volatile and risky. The
partnership and TKC are more stable businesses and provide a
steady return to investors. The partnership was formed to
appeal to relatively large investors, interested in tax
benefits. The main benefit of TKC is its liquidity; TKC also
permits the small investor to have a piece of the
business.[3] Management is shared between the three entities,
and all completed properties are sold from Koger to either TKC
or the partnership.
TKC is a cash flow business which currently owns 171
suburban office buildings. TKC has an agreement with Koger
for the exclusive right to purchase all completed and leased
properties in twelve cities. Funds are advanced to Koger in
the form of secured interim loans for the development of new
projects; this financing is then applied against the purchase
price of the buildings. TKC raises capital by borrowing, or
by issuing new stock.
TKC pays out almost 100% of its cash flow in dividends,
most of which comes from depreciation and is therefore a
tax-free return of capital. This practice, however,
necessitates regular public offerings to avoid sinking into
negative net worth (the properties are carried at original
cost) and to replenish the capital account. This dilution of
stock could be avoided by selling or trading properties.
Because the buildings are appreciating in real terms, their
market value is considerably higher than book value. Koger's
management, however, feels that the properties are too good to
sell, and does not want to incur a taxable event.[21]
Performance
Koger Properties' performance has been quite strong over
the fifteen-year period presented in Exhibit 18. Returns show
more variation than the portfolio average, but performance
during the '80s has improved. Koger Properties' coefficient
of variation for the entire holding period is 2.6, compared
with 1.8 for the consolidated portfolio and 4.2 for Bay
Financial. Since the spin-off of the Koger Company from Koger
Properties, each company has done very well. TKC's returns
have averaged three percentage points above the portfolio
average; Koger's have been even higher, more than ten percent
above the average for the consolidated portfolio. The
relative stability of the company's returns may be attributed,
in part, to the fairly high percentage of the return which
comes in the form of dividends. This has insulated investors,
to some extent, from the depreciation of the stock during
recessionary periods.
The Koger Company, unlike most public real estate
operating firms, has been extremely successful in
communicating the value of its assets to investors and
analysts. In fact, the outlook for the company is perceived
to be so good that it trades at a premium to the net asset
value of its portfolio. This anomaly can only be explained by
Koger's impressive track record.
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Exhibit 16
THE KOGER COMPANY
Discount to Net Current Value (as of December 31)
-- --------------------------------------- -------- -------
1987 1986 1985 1984 1983
---------------------------------------------------------
Shareholders' Net Equity
-Cost Basis 58,274 62,232 41,560 9,033 21,390
-Current Value 246,175 241,813 230,515 184,887 181,610
Basis
Shares Outst'g 12,369 11,568 9,905 7,686 7,552
Price/Share $26.50 $29.63 $25.25 $24.25 $23.13
--------------- ------- ------- ------- -------
Capitalization 327,779 342,702 250,101 186,382 174,649
Market-to-Current Value
as % of Equity 133.15% 141.72% 108.50% 100.81% 96.17%
----------------------------------------------------------
Source: 1987 Annual Report, Trade Line
Koger's history of success is attributable to good
management and careful strategy. Although the company is
diversified geographically, it builds only one product type -
suburban office buildings. The company uses prototype designs
and does some of its own design and general contracting. This
approach eliminates "middlemen", saves on architectural and
engineering fees, and makes prediction of costs more reliable.
These savings translate into a 20% to 30% cost advantage over
competitors, and Koger can offer lower rents and keep its
buildings fully leased. Many of its tenants are blue chip,
triple-A rated tenants who are located in various Koger
buildings throughout the southeast and southwest. Management
believes that tenants are attracted by a familiar product, as
well as good services and low rents.
Koger's low costs, concentration in suburban, sunbelt
markets, and selective marketing of high credit rate tenants
has insured its success, even during recessions and in
overbuilt markets. The company can break even at about 65%
occupancy in most office parks, but has averaged over 90%
occupancy for the last 25 years. These factors, combined with
low leverage -- with assets of $479 million (current value),
only $171 million, or 36%, is carried in debt -- have made
Koger and TKC very profitable companies, and have also earned
them a reputation as solid, low risk investments. TKC trades
at a premium to its net asset value because investors and
analysts are confident about future performance.
Current Status
Koger's management has recently issued a proposal to
merge the Koger Company with Koger Properties. Form S-4 was
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 24,
1988 and a special stockholders' meeting called for July. The
plan to merge the companies was prompted by several factors,
including the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA '86). Under the new
alternative minimum tax (AMT) for corporations, earnings and
profits replace book income as the measuring factor in
1989.[6] TKC, which was formerly a non-tax paying entity,
would be significantly affected by the AMT, since it would
incur taxes on the difference between income for tax purposes
and income for accounting purposes. Since depreciation
schedules are also lengthened under TRA '86, annual deductions
are lower and taxable income may be increased. TKC would
incur tax liability under the new tax law, reducing its
returns. Distributions to shareholders might also be taxed.
By combining TKC with Koger (which is already a taxpayer),
taxable gains from one division can be offset by losses from
another, increasing opportunities for tax shields.
In addition to the tax issue, Koger's management felt
that the separation of the development arm from the operations
division was causing some inefficiencies and confusion. By
consolidating, the company would become a stronger
organization better able to raise funds at an attractive rate.
The combined financial strength and resources would improve
Koger's access to the markets and lower its cost of capital.
After the merger, Koger plans to sponsor a REIT which
will have a similar function to the current operations of TKC.
The REIT will buy completed, fully-leased properties from
Koger and may advance funds to the company to be utilized for
the development of new properties. Koger believes that the
REIT is currently the optimal structure for holding an
operating real estate portfolio, because of the new tax laws
which favor pass-through entities as the preferred holder of
income-producing properties. TKC will not convert directly to
a REIT because it would be taxed on the difference between
current value and book value of its assets upon conversion.
The merger of the companies and subsequent sponsor of a REIT
will be a non-taxable event.
SUMMARY of CASE STUDIES
The case studies illustrate different strategies that
income-oriented companies have adopted for dealing with the
peculiarities of the public structure. No one strategy can be
offered as a model, because each company has unique
organizational and product characteristics. Each is also at a
different stage of maturity, has unique goals, and may appeal
to a different class of investor. However, some
generalizations can be made.
Investors and analysts base their estimates of a
company's value on proven performance and success. Therefore,
a company like Perini Investment Properties which is
relatively young, or Bay Financial Corporation which does not
have a track-record of generating income-producing assets,
will go through a "trial" period when it is undervalued
relative to estimates of the fair market value of its
properties. The success of the Koger Company suggests that
the market favors relatively low-risk companies which generate
a steady stream of tax-free cash flow to investors.
The successes of Koger and Perini, and the market's
response to each company's "spin-off" strategy, support the
notion that earnings-oriented businesses do not mix well with
cash-flow-oriented businesses. By splitting development from
ownership and management, the value of each entity may be
enhanced.
Changes in tax laws, such as the new alternative minimum
tax regulation, can have a significant impact on the relative
attractiveness of the public company structure. Although
private companies also bear the risk of detrimental tax law
changes, the problem is magnified for public companies which
must consider their shareholders' tax status, as well as the
company's. Complex and costly regulations and reporting
requirements are also a drawback to the public structure.
Takeover attempts are another threat which can detract from
management's ability to focus on the business of operating and
developing real estate.
For each company, all of these issues must be weighed
against the corporate structure's advantages of liquidity,
access to capital, and flexibility of operations.
Exhibit 17
BAY FINANCIAL CORPORATION - HOLDING PERIOD ANALYSIS
COEFF
TIME PERIOD TOTAL APPR. INCOME EXCESS of VAR.
AVERAGE ANNUAL RETURN
3/73-2/88 1
GEOMETRIC RETURN
Full Period
3/73-2/88 -
Business Cycle
Peak-Trough
4/73-1/75 -6
3/81-4/82
Recession
1/74-1/75 -7
3/81-4/82
Downswing(P-T)
4/73-1/75 -6
3/81-4/82
Upswing(T-P)
1/75-2/81 1
4/82-2/88
Cycle
Peak-Peak
4/73-2/81 -1
2/81-2/88
Trough-Trough
1/75-4/82 1
4/82-2/88
3.76% 3.13% 10.63%
1.82% -3.28%
7.77%
6.25%
2.50%
6.25%
7.77%
6.25%
8.41%
7.86%
0.40%
8.67%
6.03%
7.86%
-71.12%
6.25%
-75.42%
6.25%
-71.12%
6.25%
18.41%
7.16%
-12.29%
8.11%
16.03%
7.16%
1.38% 4.19
1.08% -9.94% 4.19
6.87% -71.20% (0.73)
0.00% -5.70% 2.84
6.39% -75.59% (0.70)
0.00% -5.70% 2.84
6.87% -71.20% (0.73)
0.00% -5.70% 2.84
0.00%
0.66%
9.01% 1.84
0.28% 2.25
1.29% -18.10% 5.23
0.52% -0.10% 2.34
0.00%
0.66%
6.09% 1.95
0.28% 2.25
Source: Trade Line, IDD Information Services, 1988
Exhibit 18
HOLDING PERIOD ANALYSIS
KOGER PROPERTIES INC.
TIME PERIOD TOTAL APPR.
AVERAGE ANNUAL RETURN
3/73-2/88 23.04% 16.36%
COEFF
INCOME EXCESS OF VAR
6.68% 13.83% 2.60
GEOMETRIC RETURN
Full Period
3/73-2/88
Business Cycle
Peak-Trough
4/73-1/75
3/81-4/82
Recession
1/74-1/75
3/81-4/82
Downswing(P-T)
4/73-1/75
3/81-4/82
Upswing(T-P)
1/75-2/81
4/82-2/88
Cycle
Peak-Peak
4/73-2/81
2/81-2/88
Trough-Trough
1/75-4/82
4/82-2/88
8.50% 2.62%
-40.87% -40.96%
-6.91% -13.54%
-23.86% -23.99%
-6.91% -13.54%
-40.87% -40.96%
-6.91% -13.54%
29.64% 24.93%
27.96% 17.23%
0.04%
13.17%
-3.02%
4.15%
21.84% 16.60%
27.96% 17.23%
4.47% -0.40%
0.37% -46.62%
7.73% -17.65%
0.44% -31.05%
7.73% -17.65%
0.37% -46.62%
7.73% -17.65%
4.05% 19.20%
9.52% 19.26%
3.39%
8.84%
-8.52%
3.96%
4.73% 11.22%
9.52% 19.26%
THE KOGER COMPANY
AVERAGE ANNUAL RETURN
4/82-2/88
GEOMETRIC RETURN
4/82-2/88
21.97% 11.44% 10.53% 13.637%
20.29%
0.878
9.92% 10.36% 12.03% 0.878
Source: Trade line, IDD Information Services, 1988
2.60
9.67
35.09
3.11
35.09
9.67
35.09
1.55
1.10
3.45
1.91
1.80
1.10
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The public real estate company has been examined from two
perspectives: that of the investor and that of the real estate
developer or manager. As demonstrated by the historical
performance record, investment in real estate stocks does not
offer the benefits of direct holdings of real estate. Real
estate stock returns tend to be synchronous with the returns
of the S&P, and thus do not provide diversification for most
investors. Real estate stocks do not appear to act as an
inflation hedge, since the returns are negatively correlated
with inflation indices. However, the analysis suggests that
the primary benefit of investment in real estate companies is
a high level of risk-adjusted return. The market for real
estate stocks appears to be an inefficient one in which the
investor is well-compensated for the risk he bears. As the
market becomes better-educated, and real estate stocks become
more heavily traded, this inefficiency may disappear. At this
point, it appears that the investor can profit by taking
advantage of the inefficiency in the marketplace. Real estate
stocks are an appropriate investment for the small investor
with little capital. Large corporate investors, however, can
probably achieve greater diversification and higher potential
profits through direct investment in real estate properties.
For the real estate developer or owner, the public
structure is attractive because it offers liquidity and access
to capital. For some companies, particularly cash-flow
oriented companies engaged in property ownership and
management, the problem of communicating true asset value is a
significant drawback. As companies mature, reporting
standards improve, and the market becomes increasingly
sophisticated, this problem may become less acute. The public
company must contend with other problems, including onerous
regulation and reporting requirements and changes in tax laws.
The suitability of the public structure for a company depends
on a variety of factors and individual characteristics. The
publicly-traded company is a legitimate vehicle for many
developers and income-oriented real estate companies, and is
an important segment of the real estate securities market.
NOTES
1. Correlation coefficients were estimated by regressing the
real estate stock returns against the returns of the
Standard and Poors 500 index, an index of long-term
corporate bonds, the 90-day Treasury bill, the Federal
Funds rate, and the Consumer Price Index. Real estate
stock returns are based on prices from the last day of each
quarter; all other returns are based on quarterly averages.
2. Excess return is defined as the quarterly return (income
plus appreciation) of a stock minus the quarterly return of
the 90-day Treasury bill.
3. This section is based on an interview with Thomas Steele,
Chief Executive Officer, Perini Investment Properties on
June 23, 1988 and on information from annual reports.
4. This section is based on an interview with Andrew Neher,
Chief Financial Officer, Bay Financial Corporation on July
8, 1988, and on information from annual reports.
5. This section is based on telephone interviews with Seabury
Stoneburner, Chief Financial Officer, and W. Lawrence
Jenkins, Secretary, the Koger Company during the month of
July, 1988. Information from annual reports and from Form
S-4 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
June 24, 1988 was also used.
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